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RECENT CASES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-SPEcIFIc

EXCEPTIONS TO CHARGE NEEDED

To

RAISE POINTS ON APPEAL

In March 1956, a delivery truck driven by plaintiff Lobalzo collided with
a tractor-trailer operated by defendants' employee. Lobalzo sued, contending
that the employee's negligence caused the collision. A jury trial was commenced
before the Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. At the
conclusion of the court's charge, general exceptions were urged by counsel for
both litigants. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff
sought a new trial, alleging error in the charge. His motion was denied and
judgment was entered on the verdict. Plaintiff appealed, on the ground that the
charge was erroneous in that it (1) failed to define contributory negligence;
(2) inadequately defined proximate cause; and (3) misled the jury by inferring
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held, affirmed; the refusal to grant a new trial was not reversible error
when only a general exception was taken, unless basic and fundamental errors,
incapable of correction at the trial, were committed. Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa.
5, 220 A.2d 634 (1966).
Early Pennsylvania cases permitted a general exception to preserve parts
of a charge for appeal.' An 1893 case held:
A general exception to the charge was all that was necessary. This
brought [the error] upon the record, and it was then open to correction
in any particular.... Upon an appeal the appellant may assign error
to every ruling upon the admission or rejection of evidence which
was excepted to on the trial, and to any instruction appearing in the
charge or any answer to points, whether the particular point had
been previously made the subject of an exception or not.2
In 1918, Sikorski v. Philadelphia& R. Ry. Co. 3 modified this holding. The
court relied on section 2 of the Pennsylvania Act of May 11, 1911, 4 stating, '"In
the taking of a general exception, under the act of 1911, supra, the statute
does not demand minute particularization, but it does require that reasons be
given. ' 5 The court therefore held that specific exceptions need not be taken,
but that general exceptions must state, with some specificity, what constituted
1. See, e.g., Ward v. B.T. Babbitt, Inc., 270 Pa. 370, 113 At. 558 (1921); Roberts v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 253 Pa. 126, 97 At. 1028 (1916), Curtis v. Winston, 186
Pa. 492, 40 AUt. 786 (1898) ;' Rosenthal v. Ehrlicher, 154 Pa. 396, 26 AUt. 435 (1893).
2. Rosenthal v. Ehrlicher, supra note 1, at 402-3, 25 Atl. at 436-7.
3. 260 Pa. 243, 103 AUt. 618 (1918).
4. Section 2, insofar as here pertinent, provides:
Exceptions may be taken, without allowance by the trial judge, to any part or all of
the charge... for any reason that may be alleged regarding the same in the hearing of the court, before the jury retires to consider its verdict, or, thereafter, by
leave of the court.
5. Sikorski v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 260 Pa. 243, 249, 103 Adt. 618, 619 (1918);
accord, Chamberaeti v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 262 Pa. 261, 105 Adt. 277 (1918).
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the alleged judicial error. In interpreting this decision, subsequent courts
ruled that specific exceptions were essential. 6 At least one case, however,
inferentially refrained from so holding, stating that no appeal could be allowed
because defendant "took neither specific nor general exception." 7 The result
of Sikorski and the cases thereafter has been that, in Pennsylvania, specific
exceptions are required.8 The present rule was stated in Segriff v. Johnston,o
which held that "a party may not sit by silent, take his chances on a verdict,
and, if it is adverse, then complain of a matter which, if error, could have been
eradicated during the trial if brought to the court's attention properly and
timely."' 0 In the Segriff case, no exception was taken." However, the Pennsylvania courts, and courts of other jurisdictions, treat cases in which no ex-2
ception was taken in the same manner as if a general exception was taken.'
These courts hold that specific exceptions are needed in either case. Nevertheless, if the appellate court considers the error in the charge to be "basic and
fundamental," no specific exception is needed. In these cases, errors in the
charge are reviewable when a general exception or no exception is stated in the
trial court."3 A 1955 Pennsylvania case, which is still authoritative, held that
"under a general exception to the charge of a trial judge we will consider only
and could not have been
basic and fundamental, .
such alleged errors as are
14
trial."'
the
at
corrected
Among the states other than Pennsylvania which have the specific excep0
8
tion rule are New York, 15 New Jersey,' 6 Maryland,' 7 Ohio,' Massachusetts,'
Minnesota,20 and Oregon. 21 The United States Supreme Court has also upheld
this rule, stating:
6. See Roberts v. Vallamont Traction Co., 270 Pa. 19, 112 At. 738 (1921); Commonwealth v. Scherer, 266 Pa. 210, 109 At]. 867 (1920).
7. Brunetto v. Ferrara, 167 Pa. Super. 568, 572, 76 A.2d 448, 450 (1950). In this case,
no exception was taken in the trial court.
8. See generally, Ason v. Leonhart, 402 Pa. 312, 165 A.2d 625 (1960); Robland v.
Nagy, 369 Pa. 186, 85 A.2d 88 (1952); McDonald v. Ferrebee, 366 Pa. 543, 79 A.2d 232,
(1951); Mazza v. Berlanti Construction Co., 206 Pa. Super. 505, 214 A.2d 257 (1965).
9. 402 Pa. 109, 166 A.2d 496 (1960).
10. Id. at 113, 166 A.2d at 499, quoting with approval Keefer v. Byers, 398 Pa. 447,
453, 159 A.2d 477, 480 (1960).
11. Id. at 115, 166 A.2d at 499.
12. See, e.g., Ason v. Leonhart, 402 Pa. 312, 165 A.2d 625 (1960); McDonald v. Ferrebee, 366 Pa. 543, 79 A.2d 232 (1951); Farina v. Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n, Inc. 20
A.D.2d 750, 246 N.Y.S.2d 960 (3d Dep't 1964); Storms v. City of Fulton, 263 App. Div.
927, 32 N.Y.S.2d 395 (4th Dep't 1942) (semble).
13. See Ason v. Leonhart, supra note 12; Fox v. Mulvaney, 373 Pa. 498, 96 A.2d 138
(1953); Palmer v. Sunshine Family Laundry Serv., 177 Pa. Super. 595, 112 A.2d 449 (1955).
14. Palmer v. Sunshine Family Laundry Serv., supra note 13, at 597, 112 A.2d at 450.
15. Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929).
16. E.g., Lertch v. McLean, 18 N.J. 68, 112 A.2d 735 (1955).
17. E.g., Allen Eng'r Corp. v. Lattimore, 235 Md. 182, 201 A.2d 13 (1964).
18. E.g., Burton v. Durkee, 162 Ohio St. 433, 123 N.E.2d 432 (1954).
19. E.g., Joseph v. Tata, 339 Mass. 600, 161 N.E.2d 763 (1959).
20. E.g., Daigle v. Twin City Ready Mix Concrete Co., 268 Minn. 136, 128 N.W.2d 148
(1964).
21. E.g., Leathers v. Snook, 238 Ore. 177, 393 P.2d 764 (1964).
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In fairness to the trial court and to the parties, objections to a
charge must be sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise
nature of the alleged error. When a party might have obtained the
correct charge by specifically calling the attention of the trial court
to the error and where part of the charge was
correct, he may not
22
through a general exception obtain a new trial.
The New York decisions in this regard have been more consistent throughout
the years than the Pennsylvania decisions. New York courts have repeatedly
stated that it is fair to require counsel to call to a judge's attention those
specific portions of a charge that counsel considers erroneous 23 This state has,
like Pennsylvania, held that where alleged errors in the charge are "basic and
fundamental," no exceptions are necessary. 24 In a 1951 case, the Appellate
Division explained the rationale of this practice, holding "[T]he main charge
as well as the supplementary charge ...

were basically erroneous and presented

the case to the jury on fundamentally wrong theories; and in such cases such
errors should be considered even without formal or specific exception." 25 In
addition to dispensing with the general rule if the error is "basic and fundamental," New York courts will waive the rule if a close case of liability is involved 26 or "the interests of justice" so dictate.27 The New York judiciary is
liberal in allowing review without specific exceptions, if they deem a charge so
28
inadequate as to preclude a fair consideration by the jury.
Justice Cohen, writing the majority opinion in the instant case, applies
the specific exception rule. He states that the court will not review a lower
29
court's refusal to grant a new trial, based on a general exception to a charge.
The majority contends that a lawyer must be fully aware of all relevant legal
aspects involved in cases in which he serves, and that he cannot "sit idly by,"
making no specific exceptions, and gaining a new trial if the jury decides against
22. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 119 (1943).
23. See Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 192, 117 N.E.2d 237, 247 (1954);
Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 141, 169 N.E. 112, 117 (1929).
24. See Peerless Cas. Co. v. Bordi, 6 A.D.2d 21, 174 N.Y.S.2d 489 (3d Dep't 1958);
Thoens v. J. A. Kennedy Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 216, 108 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1st Dep't
1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 753, 108 N.E.2d 616 (1952); Zeffiro v. Porfido, 265 App. Div. 185,
38 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1st Dep't 1942).
25. Thoens v. J. A. Kennedy Realty Corp., supra note 24, at 223, 108 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
In this case, the trial court's charge did not mention what is needed for a binding oral
agreement. The Appellate Division said the court should have instructed as to the essential
elements needed.
26. See Fields v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 334, 151 N.E.2d 188, 175 N.Y.S.2d 27
(1958); Carroll v. Harris, 23 A.D.2d 582, 256 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2d Dep't 1965); Martinez v.
Adelphi Hosp., 21 A.D.2d 675, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (2d Dep't 1964).
27. See Carroll v. Harris, supra note 26; Arroyo v. Judena Taxi, Inc., 20 A.D.2d 888,
248 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1st Dep't 1964); Farina v. Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n, Inc., 20 A.D.2d
750, 246 N.Y.S.2d 960 (3d Dep't 1964); Molnar v. Slattery Contracting Co., 8 A.D.2d 95,
185 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1st Dep't 1959); Juskow v. Tow. Ulanow Swintejo Jana Chrziciela (Cavalry Society of St. John the Baptise, Inc.), 4 A.D.2d 1003, 167 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2d Dep't 1957) ;.
Nicotra v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 App. Div. 1004, 51 N.Y.S.2d 953 (2d Dep't
1944); Storms v. City of Fulton, 263 App. Div. 927, 32 N.Y.S.2d 395 (4th Dep't 1942).
28. Arroyo v. Judena Taxi, Inc., supra note 27.
29. Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 6, 220 A.2d 634, 635 (1966) [hereinafter cited
instant case].
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his client. The opinion, without explanation, rejects plaintiff's contention that
the three alleged errors are "basic and fundamental." 8 0 A concurring opinion,
written by Justice Roberts, states that the problems of trial delays are acute,
and that a contrary decision in the instant case would result in calendar congestion and force countless numbers of persons "to endure oppressive delay or
to settle claims at a fraction of their value ....131 He also maintains that the
principles involved here are ones with which any lawyer of competence should
be familiar. In the final paragraph of his opinion, Justice Roberts states:
[T]he present case does not present the appropriate occasion for defining what would support the grant of a new trial even in the absence
of a specific exception to the charge. Such a definition should, and I
trust will, be resolved on a case by case analysis of the particular
circumstances and legal principles involved. Thus the approach embodied in today's decision does not in any way restrict the right of an
appellate court, under appropriate circumstances, to set aside a verdict
and to grant3 2a new trial because of fundamental error in the court's
instructions.
Justice Musmanno bases his dissenting opinion on social policy grounds, inquiring why a lawyer is declared at fault in failing to note a trial judge's error,
while the judge is not declared to be at fault for perpetrating the error in the
first place. 83 He contends that the charge was confusing and that the court
should reverse, and he concludes by maintaining that the majority adheres to
the notion that "a trial is in the nature of a game of chess, and not a serious
enterprise dedicated to the ascertainment of truth and the rendition of justice." 84
The principles involved herein seem settled: a specific exception to an
alleged error in a charge is necessary to raise the point on appeal, unless the
error committed is a "basic and fundamental" one. In the latter situation, a
general exception or lack of any exception is deemed sufficient. These principles
form the framework of the law in this area, but their application is uncertain.
Justice Roberts, in his concurring opinion in Lobalzo, has stated that a case by
case analysis should define what would support a new trial in the absence of a
specific exception. 85 This type of analysis is definitely necessary. At present,
there are no guidelines in either Pennsylvania or New York to determine what
is or what is not "basic and fundamental," or, what is meant in New York
by "in the interest of justice." One essential quality of the system of legal pre.
cedents is predictability. Here, there is no way to determine what types of errors
are so basic as to dispense with the necessity for a specific exception; hence,
uncertainty reigns. While it is true that a judicial decision can never be forecast
with exactness, both bench and bar need some indicators. These are lacking
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

7, 220 A.2d at 635.
8, 220 A.2d at 636.
9-10, 220 A.2d at 637.
11, 220 A.2d at 637.
13, 220 A.2d at 639.
9-10, 220 A.2d at 637.
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here. Once adequate guidelines are established, then the merit of the specific
exception rule can be determined; until that time, attempts in this direction
would be futile. In setting guidelines, courts should take a liberal view of what
is a "basic and fundamental" error. For example, in the instant case, the errors
alleged involved an inadequate definition of proximate cause, a failure to define
contributory negligence and an improper inference of contributory negligence.
These allegations, if proved, should be considered basic, as they relate to vital
problems involved in negligence cases.
One possible solution to the exception problem is the use of uniform jury
instructions, also known as pattern jury instructions. These are pre-written
instructions to be included, when relevant, in the court's charge. In New York,
a Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Association of Supreme Court
Justices has written a volume containing many different types of instructions
to juries, based on various legal elements. 36 There is a comment section following each recommended charge, suggesting when variations from the instruction
might be advisable. In Pennsylvania, the President of the State Bar Association
has appointed a committee to evaluate the feasibility of such uniform instructions. By use of pattern instructions similar to those of New York, counsel
could submit a list of requests for the charge, along with suggestions for variations, if any, from the pattern instructions. The charge could then be given, in
writing, to counsel before being read to the jury. If this were done, counsel
could only object to the instructions on two grounds: (1) improper inclusion
or exclusion of a pattern instruction, or (2) improper variation of a pattern
instruction or lack of variation, as applicable. If counsel had a copy of the
charge in advance of its reading to the jury, a copy of the pattern instructions,
and an opportunity to compare them, he would not be handicapped or inconvenienced by being required to specifically except.
Another possible solution, if uniform jury instructions are not adopted, is
to charge the jurors both before and after the actual trial of issues. Before evidence is taken, the judge could instruct as to the general elements of the case,
and after counsel had concluded, the jury could be instructed as to the particulars of the case at hand. Relevant parts of the initial charge could be repeated at that time.87 It should be noted that some judges, at the present time,
38
do instruct at both the beginning and conclusion of trials.
The proposition that justice demands competent counsel affording the trial
judge an opportunity to correct his charge3 9 is the basis for the prevailing spe36. 1 Association of Supreme Court Justices, Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions,
New York Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) (1965). In New York, the Administrative

Board of the Judicial Conference has appointed a committee to formulate pattern jury in-

structions for use in criminal cases; N.Y.Lj., Nov. 7, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
37. Prettyman, Jury Instructions-Firstor Last?, 46 A.B.A.J. 1066 (1960).

38. Ibid.

39. Corby, Objections to Jury Instructions; Why, When, How, 47 Ill. B.J. 763, 771
(1959); Pinsky, Necessityof Excepting to An Erroneous Charge to the Jury, 11 Syracuse

L. Rev. 234, 244 (1960); Wehrli, Exceptions to the Charge to the Jury, 28 F.R.D. 37, 256
(1960).
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cific exception rule. This rule dispenses with the need for exceptions where the
error charged is "basic and fundamental." However, there are no adequate
guidelines to determine what errors are "basic and fundamental," which leaves
room for uncertainty in the majority rule's application. Thus, the specific exception rule is not readily acceptable. The minority view, maintaining that
general exceptions are sufficient, is ably stated by Justice Musmanno's dissent
in the instant case. The argument for this position is that a litigant should not
be penalized for his attorney's failure to specifically except.40 The minority
holding is unacceptable because it discourages counsel from delineating his reasons for objecting; this makes it difficult for the trial judge to analyze the precise error alleged and if necessary, correct his charge. On balancing the above
considerations, the specific exception rule seems preferable. If coupled with uniform jury instructions, an initial charge prior to the introduction of evidence
and/or a clarification of the instances where a general exception will suffice, the
specific exception rule can be endorsed without reservation.
ROBERT P. FINE

THE

CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY-THE WISCONSIN "EXPERIMENT"
ALI TEST

WITH

Defendant, after entering a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, was
tried and convicted of arson, burglary and armed robbery in the Circuit Court
of Milwaukee County. The defense offered several alternative tests for criminal
responsibility as instructions to the jury; that of the American Law Institute,'
the test advocated by the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,2
the Durham test 3 and the Currens test.4 The proposed instructions also included
an instruction which would inform the jury that if the insanity plea was successful the defendant would be mandatorily hospitalized0 until an appropriate mental
40. Instant case at 11, 220 A.2d at 637.
1. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (hereinafter refered to as ALI test); Elements in the
instruction: "lack of substantial capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or lack of
substantial capacity to conform conduct to the requirements of the law"; State v. Shoffner,
143 N.W.2d at 460 (1966) (hereinafter cited instant case).
2. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-53 Report, para. 333, at 116 (Cmnd.
No. 8932). Elements in the instruction: "whether accused was suffering from disease of the
mind to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible," instant case at 460.
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Elements in the instruction:
"whether the act is the product of mental illness"; instant case at 460.
4. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Elements in the instruction:
"lack of substantial capacity to conform conduct to the requirements of the law"; instant
case at 460.
5. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 957.11(3) (1958) which reads in part: "If found not guilty because
insane, or not guilty because feeble minded, the defendant shall be committed to the central
state hospital or to an institution designated by the Department of Public Welfare, there to
be detained, until discharged in accordance with the law." Cf. People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d
27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
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